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REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR ABORTION LAW REFORM 
 
KATE GALLOWAY* AND JEMIMA MCGRATH** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Australia has seen a number of efforts at reform of abortion laws in recent years. 
Jurisdictions such as Tasmania, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern 
Territory have decriminalised abortion entirely, and other states such as South Australia 
and Western Australia have made efforts to reform abortion law without complete 
decriminalisation. At the other end of the spectrum, Queensland and New South Wales 
legislation still lists abortion as a criminal offence, and although this is mitigated by case 
law, there has been no successful attempt to reform abortion law in these jurisdictions. This 
article canvasses the current review of Queensland’s abortion laws. 
Revision of the Queensland Criminal Code in 1997, the culmination of a protracted and 
highly politicised process, had failed to mention abortion law reform. Queensland’s 
Women and the Criminal Code Taskforce recommended repealing the abortion laws,1 but 
these recommendations were not implemented. In Queensland, abortion law reform has 
simmered in the political background.2 Most recently, however, following the withdrawal 
of a private member’s Bill presented to the Queensland Parliament in 2016,3 the newly 
installed Palaszczuk government referred the question of reform of Queensland’s 
termination laws to the Queensland Law Reform Commission (‘QLRC’).4 
The QLRC has now handed down its report,5 and the Government has accepted all 28 
recommendations. It is anticipated that a Bill will be put to the Queensland Parliament 
before the end of 2018. In the lead up to the Bill, it is useful to consider the framing of the 
contemporary debate about abortion law reform in Australia in particular, in light of its 
contentious nature.  
The QLRC inquiry consultation questions opened by asking ‘Who should be permitted to 
perform, or assist in performing, lawful terminations of pregnancy?’ While this question 
illustrates broader and traditional legal approaches to the regulation of abortion, it was 
however, question two that provided the crux of law reform efforts for pro-choice 
campaigners: ‘Should a woman be criminally responsible for the termination of her own 
pregnancy?’ If the inquiry had started with this second question, and had answered ‘no’, 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Law, Bond University. 
** B Psych/LLB student. 
1 Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, Parliament of Queensland, Report of the Taskforce on Women 
and the Criminal Code (2000)   
2 See, eg, discussion in Katherine Kerr, ‘Queensland Abortion Laws: Criminalising One in Three Women’ 
(2014) 14(2) QUT Law Review 15, doi: https://doi.org/10.5204/qutlr.v14i2.540.  
3 Abortion Law Reform (Woman's Right to Choose) Amendment Bill 2016 (Qld); Health (Abortion Law 
Reform) Amendment Bill 2016 (Qld).  
4 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Termination of Pregnancy Laws Consultation Paper, WP 
No 76 (December 2017) (‘Consultation Paper’). 
5 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Termination of Pregnancy Laws Report No 76, June 
2018. 
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then based on principles of reproductive justice the answers to remaining 20 questions 
would have become clear.  
Broadly speaking, the QLRC consultation questions canvassed who should be permitted to 
perform or assist in performing terminations, the limits and grounds of terminations 
including requirements for counselling of women and medical practitioners’ consultation, 
questions of conscientious objection, safe access zones, and data collection. These matters 
were addressed in the recommendations, which fell under five broad categories:  
• abortion should generally be treated as a health matter; 
• women’s autonomy and health should be promoted; 
• Queensland laws should align with contemporary international human rights 
obligations; 
• Queensland laws should be consistent with contemporary clinical practice; and  
• Queensland laws should be broadly consistent with other Australian jurisdictions 
that have modernised their abortion laws 
Abortion is a touchstone for social, ethical, and religious norms. It is these norms that have 
informed the law and that continue to generate such heated debate. On the other hand, 
invoking criminal law to sanction both women and their treating doctors fails to recognise 
women’s agency as equal citizens. Further, and in any event, criminalisation of abortion 
fails to address the broader contexts of women’s lives that affect their reproductive 
choices.This article uses the framework of questions in the QLRC consultation paper to 
review—yet again—the ongoing need for abortion law reform in Queensland specifically, 
but through analogy, in Australia generally. While answering the QLRC questions, we 
frame our inquiry around empowering women’s self-determination to make decisions 
about their reproductive health as a hallmark of their equality as citizens. Accordingly, we 
first address the underlying question of criminal responsibility for pregnancy termination 
as a question of reproductive rights, then analyse the broader social contexts of termination 
services necessary to deliver reproductive justice. These demand attention to matters such 
as the effect of service location, age, access to qualified health professionals, privacy, and 
gender diversity. 
At the outset, we recognise diversity in gender amongst those capable of becoming 
pregnant. We use the term ‘woman’ throughout this article, but we acknowledge the 
experiences of those who do not identify as female. It follows that the law surrounding 
termination of pregnancy should be framed to ensure that it accommodates reproductive 
justice for all who are pregnant. 
II. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREGNANCY TERMINATION 
In the liberal tradition embedded within Australian systems of governance, the autonomy 
of individuals is paramount. Autonomy manifests as various freedoms for the individual to 
determine their best life with minimal state intrusion. Yet the state itself determines the 
competence of individuals to exercise their freedoms. Paradoxically, the state intervenes in 
the most intimate of circumstances to constrain individual freedom yet in other areas is 
slow to afford protection against bodily incursions. This is notably the case in 
circumstances involving sex and gender.6 
                                                 
6 Frances E Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 96(7) The 
Harvard Law Review 1497. 
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Traditionally, and in accordance with social norms derived from a patriarchal order, the 
state has upheld a social and legal paradox whereby women are both autonomous citizens 
equal with men, while at the same time are incompetent to make autonomous choices about 
various aspects of their lives—especially their bodies. 
The criminalisation of pregnancy termination is one such example. Underpinning the crime 
of procuring the termination of one’s own pregnancy is the assumption of women’s 
incompetence to exercise self-determination and autonomy in decisions about her bodily 
integrity.7 Once pregnant, the law constructs ‘woman’ as a different being8 and regulates 
her body accordingly. Morris and Nott point out that: ‘English law has denied personhood 
to the foetus but tends to treat pregnant women as being in conflict, ie woman against 
foetus’.9 This opposition is recognised in arguments about the gestational stage permitted 
for termination, which assume the priority of a foetus over the woman.10 
Opposition is implicitly embedded also where the interests and autonomy of the woman 
are considered as secondary to the interests of the state and other actors. Thus, the QLRC’s 
consultation paper prioritises the question of who should be permitted to perform or assist 
in performing an abortion11—rather than commencing with the question of whether a 
woman should suffer criminal sanction in making a decision about her own body.  
A. Decriminalisation and Reproductive Rights 
Abortion can be considered one aspect of women’s reproductive rights. To the extent that 
the law provides criminal sanction for a woman who procures termination of her 
pregnancy, such laws breach women’s reproductive rights as well as her bodily autonomy.  
Helpfully, London outlines four human rights principles underlying reproductive rights: 
1. Choice of whether and when to bear a child; 
2. Privacy of personal decisions about sexual intimacy and childbearing; 
3. Freedom from governmental interference in medical decisions made by an 
individual with her doctor; and 
4. Autonomy exercised through the freedom to make decisions about one’s body.12 
While not enshrined in law, the Queensland Parliamentary Committee on Surrogacy made 
recommendations based upon the concept of rights or freedoms to choose to have a child.13 
Although couched in terms of ‘parents’ rather than women, this example illustrates the 
capacity of the law to comprehend the notion of reproductive rights. 
On a reproductive rights basis, the core question to be answered by the QLRC consultation 
should therefore have been whether a woman should suffer criminal sanction for procuring 
her own abortion. The answer is that a woman should not be criminally responsible for the 
                                                 
7 See, eg, Kerr, above n 2. 
8 Anne Morris and Susan Nott ‘The Law’s Engagement with Pregnancy’ in Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns 
(eds) Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body (Dartmouth, 1995) 53, 55. 
9 Ibid 56. 
10 See, eg, ibid 42, [146]. 
11 Consultation Paper, above n 4, v, Questions 1 and 2. 
12 Sarah London, ‘Reproductive Justice: Developing a Lawyering Model’ (2011) 13 Berkeley Journal of 
African American Law and Policy 71, 76. 
13 Queensland Parliament, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee Report (2008), 18, 20. The 
Committee had been established to ‘investigate and report to the Parliament on the possible decriminalisation 
and regulation of altruistic surrogacy in Queensland’. The recommendations resulted in the enactment of the 
Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld). 
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termination of her own pregnancy. The remaining questions in the QLRC consultation 
would then have become subsidiary to the woman’s right to be considered an agentic 
individual at law. 
B. Who Might Lawfully Perform Abortions and When 
Once the law accepts the woman as an autonomous citizen responsible for her bodily 
integrity, the question of abortion becomes a medical rather than a legal question. 
On the assumption that termination of pregnancy, whether surgical or medical, is a medical 
procedure, then subject to clinical recommendation as to expertise, it becomes subject to 
the same regulation as other medical procedures. This is a clinical question rather than one 
of law and does not therefore require specific provision within the criminal law which 
otherwise deals with assault and offences by unqualified persons. 
Further, clinical guidelines informed by medical ethics are best placed to dictate the 
circumstances of a termination, including as to: 
1. Gestational stage; 
2. Woman’s health;  
3. Foetal viability;  
4. Practitioner consultation; and 
5. Whether the termination is undertaken medically or surgically. 
Where medical practice is guided by norms of decision-making in the patient’s best 
interests and of harm-minimisation, it is appropriate for evidence-based clinical guidelines 
to inform practice, rather than the criminal law.14 
III. REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 
Merely enacting reproductive rights—and thus formal equality—is not, however, sufficient 
to achieve reproductive justice. Therefore, analysis of the extent to which the law might 
support reproductive rights must consider the effect of power relations and differential 
resources on women’s ability to access abortion services.15 For example, one consistent 
effect of criminalisation of abortion is the likely availability of safe medical services to 
those who can pay, and the exclusion from safe medical services of those who cannot 
afford them.16 
                                                 
14 See eg, M Berer, ‘Making Abortions Safe: A Matter of Good Public Health Policy and Practice’ (2000) 
78(5) Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 580; David A Grimes et al, ‘Unsafe Abortion: The 
Preventable Pandemic’ (2006) 368 The Lancet 1908, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69481-6; 
Lachlan J de Crespigny and Julian Savelescu, ‘Abortion: Time to Clarify Australia's Confusing Laws’ (2004) 
181(4) Medical Journal of Australia 201. 
15 London, above n 12, 77. See also Barbara Baird, ‘Decriminalization and Women’s Access to Abortion in 
Australia’ (2017) 19(1) Health and Human Rights 197; L A Keogh et al, ‘Intended and Unintended 
Consequences of Abortion Law Reform: Perspectives of Abortion Experts in Victoria, Australia’ (2016) 
Journal of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care  doi: 10.1136/jfprhc-2016-101541. 
16 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, ‘Law of Abortion’ Final Report 15 (March 2008), Appendix 
One, [A28]; Caroline de Moel-Mandel and Julia M Shelley, ‘The Legal and Nonlegal Barriers to Abortion 
Access in Australia: A Review of the Evidence’ (2017) 22(2) The European Journal of 
Contraception & Reproductive Health Care 114, DOI: 10.1080/13625187.2016.1276162. 
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Power relations and resources are relevant not only in achieving equality of access to safe 
abortion, but also in considering the context within which a woman decides to terminate 
her pregnancy.  
The socio-economic determinants of health are well rehearsed.17 Where abortion is treated 
as a health issue, a woman’s socio-economic circumstances therefore become relevant in 
making decisions about whether to proceed with a pregnancy. For the law to delimit 
circumstances that warrant termination18 will inevitably fail to comprehend the woman’s 
experience of her circumstances. By contrast, as a medical or clinical matter, the health 
practitioner is best placed to advise based on what is appropriate to the woman in her 
circumstances. 
Of note, in the case of termination of pregnancy, it is ill-conceived to make assumptions 
about socio-economic determinants of women’s health based upon standard demographic 
indicators such as place of domicile or household income. A woman whose outward 
appearance and location of her domicile might give the impression of access to financial 
means. However, as a consequence of gendered power dynamics within the household, she 
may not have access to sufficient economic resources to support a child, or to bear the 
costs of a termination. 
Specific to the reform of the law of termination of pregnancy, a framework of reproductive 
justice requires consideration of the effect of the law on the availability of relevant medical 
services to all women, including with reference to: 
1. Location of services; 
2. Age and therefore capacity to give consent to medical or surgical procedures;  
3. Access to relevantly qualified medical and allied health professionals; and 
4. Privacy of service delivery. 
A. Location of Services 
As observed in the QLRC Consultation Paper, the majority of abortion services in 
Queensland are carried out by private providers.19 Consequently, terminations are 
relatively easy to access in many metropolitan areas but are increasingly difficult to access 
in regional and in particular, in remote areas. This is now a real issue for Tasmanian 
women, who have recently lost access to terminations in that state following the closure of 
the sole (private) provider, and is also an issue across regional Australia. Abortion may be 
currently permitted under Queensland law, but the current system, as it does also elsewhere 
in Australia, discriminates indirectly between metropolitan and regional women.20 
Decriminalisation of terminations so that they become a health matter will facilitate 
provision within the existing health network including to regional and remote women. This 
change in focus will bring medical resources within the reach of all women. 
B. Age 
While location is one issue affecting reproductive justice, so too is age—through the 
question of capacity to give informed consent. As the Consultation Paper points out,21 
                                                 
17 See, eg, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australia’s Health 2016, Chapter 4 ‘Determinants of 
Health’ <https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/australias-health/australias-health-2016/contents/determinants>.  
18 Such as those discussed in the Consultation Paper, above n 4 44–7. 
19 Consultation Paper, above n 4, 20.  
20 de Moel-Mandel and Shelley, above n 16. 
21 Consultation Paper, above n 4, 9. 
Galloway & McGrath  6 
minors may be deemed capable of giving consent to a medical procedure. Where they are 
not, the Court may be asked to invoke its parens patraie jurisdiction to authorise the 
decision. 
In Queensland, the decision of Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service v Q22 
highlights the need for reform in this area. Although the 12-year-old girl seeking a 
termination of her pregnancy was in this case deemed capable of consenting to the 
procedure, the relevant authorities sought the imprimatur of the Court. The Court ordered 
that the girl’s father be included in the decision-making—against the girl’s express wishes 
that the father not be told.23  
Where abortion remains illegal, obtaining a court order protects decisions of treating 
doctors against possible criminal action. By contrast, surgery such as a tonsillectomy, or 
administration of drugs such as steroids or cancer drugs would not require the court’s 
permission. Involvement of the Court in this case—arising because of the possibility of 
criminal sanctions—adversely affected the girl, delayed her treatment and her suffering, 
and interfered with her bodily autonomy even as she was deemed to have capacity for self-
determination. 
Decriminalisation of abortion, coupled with a therapeutic approach and bounded by the 
norms and laws concerning informed patient consent and self-determination, would 
necessarily avoid Court intervention in such circumstances. 
C. Access to Relevantly Qualified Professionals 
Related to location of services is access to relevantly qualified professionals. In terms of 
reproductive justice, this requires considering contexts beyond health services per se, to the 
professional mix required to ensure equity of access to abortion services. 
Notably, the Consultation Paper questions the need for counselling services as a 
prerequisite to obtaining a lawful termination. A health-based approach rather than a legal 
approach offers a different way of understanding the role of and need for counselling. The 
law need have no role in mandating counselling as a pre-requisite. Instead, counselling 
would be a component of ensuring patient autonomy to make decisions about her own 
body, free from coercion that might occur within her social context. This offers a model of 
patient care as well as satisfying legal requirements of consent to a procedure. In other 
words, provision of relevantly qualified counsellors as integral to the process of offering 
advice to women seeking a termination, speaks to informed consent but, as with any other 
medical procedure, need not be mandated as an element of lawfulness. 
In attempting to paint a pro-choice approach to abortion as anti-women, some (effectively) 
suggest that abortion is a patriarchal tool designed to prevent women from exercising 
reproductive freedom—ie freedom to give birth. Abortion is indeed a tool involved in 
women’s reproductive freedom. It might liberate women from the burdens of bearing, 
delivering, and raising a child as an expression of her bodily autonomy—but it might also 
be used as a tool of oppression where that woman desires to go ahead with her pregnancy.  
The possibility of abortion being used coercively is, however, no reason to criminalise the 
practice. Instead, it is reason to ensure that women are in a position to give free, prior, and 
                                                 
22 [2016] QSC 89 (26 Apr 2016). 
23 Heather Douglas and Caroline de Costa, ‘Time to Repeal Outdated Abortion Laws in New South Wales 
and Queensland’ (2016) 205(8) Medical Journal of Australia 1, doi: 10.5694/mja16.00807. 
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informed consent to the procedure upon obtaining qualified advice, including counselling. 
In particular, women experiencing pressure, domination, or violence need the opportunity 
to work through their concerns until they are able to make an informed decision. That 
decision may well reflect her coercive circumstances, but counselling offers the 
opportunity to make the decision on her own terms in light of her social context. 
For this reason, the law should recognise, and clinical guidelines should reflect, that in 
light of gendered power dynamics and socio-economic determinants, consent to 
termination will in most circumstances be ‘informed’ where the woman has been afforded 
access to qualified counselling in reaching her decision. 
D. Conscientious Objection 
It is one thing to decriminalise abortion, but quite another to require health practitioners to 
provide those services. In such a ethically-charged issue there is a balance to be achieved 
between the expression of the conscientious concerns of health providers, and the 
autonomy of women seeking reproductive services. 
Reproductive justice inevitably demands provision of public health services, ensuring 
equality of access for all women.24 This particularly an issue for women in remote and 
regional areas, where there is a far smaller pool of relevantly qualified professionals. In 
such circumstances, if a health practitioner conscientiously objects to delivery of 
reproductive health services, a woman may have no practical alternative. 
In terms of an individual’s health practice however, in accordance with the underlying 
principle of women’s agency over their bodily autonomy and in particular in the case of 
emergency, there are four constraints on the exercise of conscientious objection. 
The first of these involves an emergency where the woman’s life is in danger, or where 
there is a risk of grave harm to the woman. In these circumstances, a health care provider 
should not be entitled to withhold reproductive services, including a termination, based on 
conscientious objection. While this shifts the balance of autonomy from the health care 
provider to the woman, the imminent danger to the woman justifies the imposition on the 
health care provider. 
Secondly, to address the inequality of access to reproductive services experienced by 
remote and regional women, a health care provider should not withhold reproductive 
services, including a termination, based on conscientious objection where there are no 
other geographically proximate services.25 Again, this is a shift in the autonomy of the 
health care provider to the woman, recognising the potentially greater harm to the woman 
from denying care. In practical terms, this principle is likely to require the state to ensure 
adequate staffing levels of appropriately qualified professionals who are able to provide 
these services.  
                                                 
24 See, eg, discussion in Ronli Sifris, ‘The Legal and Factual Status of Abortion in Australia’ (2013) 38(2) 
Alternative Law Journal 108. 
25 See, eg, Keogh et al, above n 15; de Moel-Mandel and Shelley, above n 16; Mridula Shankar et al, 
‘Access, Equity and Costs of Induced Abortion Services in Australia: A Cross-sectional Study’ (2017) 41(3) 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 309, doi: 10.1111/1753-6405.12641; Ronli Sifris, ‘A 
Woman’s Right to Choose’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan (eds) Contemporary Human Rights Issues in 
Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2013) 251, 25; Victorian Rural Women’s Access to Family Planning Services 
Report (2012) <http://whv.org.au/static/files/assets/c6ba5133/Victorian-rural-womens-access-to-family-
planning-services-survey-report-August-2012.pdf>. 
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Australian jurisdictions where abortion is legal have provided for conscientious 
objection,26 predominantly in non-emergency situations—although they do not distinguish 
between objection to provision of direct and ancillary services. There is some debate in 
jurisdictions that require practitioners to perform emergency abortions regardless of 
conscience, most notably in Victoria, where the Catholic Church threatened to close its 
hospitals because of the conscientious objection clause.27 Such legislative provisions are, 
however, similar enough to equivalent English provisions that the test of proximity set out 
by the House of Lords might be persuasive in Australian jurisdictions. The House of Lords 
applied this test in considering who was entitled to conscientiously object under the 
Abortion Act 1967 (UK). It found that only those participating in the procedure had 
sufficient proximity to be excused based on conscientious objection.28 On this rationale, 
medical receptionists, counsellors, or other ancillary staff would not have grounds for 
conscientious objection to providing information, for example, to a woman seeking a 
termination. 
Through the lens of reproductive justice, the question of conscientious objection might be 
addressed indirectly. Thus, a health care provider who conscientiously objects to providing 
reproductive services whether direct or ancillary, and including termination, should refer 
the woman, in a clinically timely way, to another geographically proximate health provider 
that will provide the relevant service.29 A conscientious objector should not be permitted to 
refuse to refer a woman based on their conscientious objection. This provides a balance 
between recognising the imposition on the conscientious objector, while respecting the 
woman’s right to choose. Providing for the clinical context reinforces the health-based 
approach to abortion, and the professional responsibilities of care.  
E. Privacy  
A component of reproductive rights, privacy in abortion law reform is relevant in a number 
of ways, the first two of which are dealt with above:  
1. privacy from state intervention;  
2. privacy from others influencing the decision she makes in consultation with her 
health care providers;  
3. privacy from grandstanding or harassment in the vicinity of the clinic; and  
4. privacy from dissemination of her name, image, or personal details in connection 
with any reproductive service.  
In respect of the third and fourth of these aspects of privacy, in the interests of effectively 
providing health care services to women seeking a termination, it should be unlawful to 
harass, intimidate or obstruct both a woman who is considering, or who has undergone, a 
termination of pregnancy; or a person who performs or assists, or who has performed or 
assisted in performing, a lawful termination of pregnancy. 
                                                 
26 Northern Territory, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia. See discussion in, eg, 
Victorian Law Reform Submission, above, n 16. The Australian Medical Association did not support 
conscientious objection (at p114). 
27 Anna O’Rourke, Lachlan de Crespigny and Amanda Pyman, ‘Abortion and Conscientious Objection: The 
New Battleground’ (2012) 38(3) Monash University Law Review 87. 
28 See Janaway v Salford AHA [1988] 3 All ER 1079. 
29 See, eg, Termination of Pregnancy Law Reform Act 2017 (NT), s11. 
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In recognition that decriminalisation of pregnancy termination is not of itself sufficient to 
provide access for women needing termination services, Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT30 
have each enacted safe access zone legislation as a means of supporting women’s access to 
reproductive services.  
Rather than establish the extent of a safe access zone in legislation, ministerial discretion is 
a flexible means of dealing with strategies from time to time of those who seek to harass, 
intimidate, or obstruct the provision or receiving of reproductive services. 
A reproductive justice approach to regulating abortion provides guidance on how to 
determine the extent of the safe access zone. Although safe access zones should through 
their operation protect women and those carrying out the relevant services, ministerial 
discretion to enact a safe access zone would recalibrate the power imbalance between those 
seeking to harass, intimidate, or obstruct, and the women involved.31 The rationale is that 
failing to enact a safe access zone allows for circumstances that will prevent women from 
exercising their bodily autonomy. 
Those arguing against safe access zones cite their right to free expression. What this claim 
fails to acknowledge is the vulnerability of those seeking a termination, and the relative 
power wielded by those seeking free expression. The extent of the safe access zone must 
therefore reflect a balance between the harm done to the women in accessing health care 
services, and the intrusion into the lives of those prevented from carrying out their 
activities within that zone. The size of the zone would therefore become the area 
reasonably necessary to ensure equity of access to reproductive services. 
The types of activities constrained within the zone also requires balancing competing 
claims. A principled approach to determining prohibited activities would aim at any 
activity designed to deter a woman from seeking reproductive health care at the facility 
associated with that safe access zone or disseminating a view on reproduction. This 
approach recognises that women will receive the best clinical care, including full 
information on which to make her decision. It is not the purview of the general public to 
intervene in attempting to convince a woman about her healthcare. In prosecuting her 
autonomy, a woman is entitled to access health services free from unsolicited attempts to 
convince her otherwise. Those outside the relevant facility are not entitled to air their 
views in light of the availability of qualified health care expertise within the facility. In 
light of the distressing nature of such information and the public context within which it is 
delivered, such activity should be constrained by law. 
As a feature of reproductive justice, the privacy of women using or approaching the 
facilities extends to dissemination of their images, names, and personal details 
electronically or otherwise. Creation or dissemination of such details should constitute an 
offence. This is no more than what is already provided for in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), 
for example, in relation to sensitive information. 
Ensuring a safe work environment for those providing health care services requires the 
same protection. Such provisions will also ensure that health care service provider staff can 
                                                 
30 See, eg, Heather Douglas and Katherine Kerr, ‘Abortion, Law Reform and the Context of Decisionmaking’ 
(2016) 25(1) Griffith Law Review 129, doi: 10.1080/10383441.2016.1201882. 
31 See, eg, Ronli Sifris, ‘State by State, “Safe Access Zones” Around Clinics are Shielding Women from 
Abortion Protesters’ The Conversation (30 November 2015) <https://theconversation.com/state-by-state-
safe-access-zones-around-clinics-are-shielding-women-from-abortion-protesters-51407>.  
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continue to carry out their work unmolested, ensuring continuity of service for women who 
need it. 
F. Collection of Data about Terminations of Pregnancy  
Ensuring effective provision of reproductive services throughout the state requires data 
concerning the need for and delivery of such services. It is therefore appropriate to provide 
for collection of patient information but only where appropriate safeguards are 
incorporated. For example, anonymisation of patient records is imperative to ensure 
privacy both in terms of the possibility of reconstructing de-identified information, but also 
to protect against the possibility of unauthorised or unintended leaks. 
Any data collection system must also cater for the likelihood of identification of patients in 
regional and remote areas. Such patients are likely to be readily identifiable with only 
minimal demographic information. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While there have been advances in the law surrounding termination of pregnancy in other 
Australian jurisdictions, the fight for lawful access to safe abortion services in Queensland 
is ongoing, even in the lead up to the introduction of a reform Bill. Hard-won concessions 
are always at risk, as evidenced by the decision to prosecute Tegan Leach and her partner 
in 2010.32 Further, the ongoing referral of abortion laws to various committee and law 
reform processes has so far failed to clarify or to advance the law in Queensland. Such 
drawn-out processes have the appearance of a lack of political will to address the issue 
head on. 
While there is a myriad of complex questions that are posited for examination through a 
legal lens, we suggest instead exploration of the notion of women’s reproductive rights, 
and reproductive justice as an alternative means of assessing the role of the law. Such a 
framework recognises the social context of pregnancy and termination and seeks to uphold 
women’s agency within that context. We suggest that reproductive justice affords a more 
positive—and a less punitive—approach to resolving the law’s involvement in what should 
more properly be regarded as a question of women’s health. 
                                                 
32 R v Brennan and Leach [2010] QDC 329. 
